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This chapter describes the process of political reform in late twentieth-
centuryAfricaandexploresitsimpactontheeconomicbehaviorofgovern-
ments. When I speak of “political reform,” I refer to the movement from
no-party or one-party to multi-party political systems or from military to
civilianregimes.Largelyignoringpoliticalliberties–freedomofassociation
This chapter draws extensively from Humphreys and Bates (2005). The chapter was written
with ﬁnancial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant SES 9905568), the
Carnegie Corporation, and the Center for International Development and the Weatherhead
Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. I wrote it while a Moore
Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology. The chapter has beneﬁted
greatly from comments and criticisms received at seminars held at Harvard University,
Guelo Brittany, and at the annual meetings of the AERC 2004 in Nairobi. Special thanks go
to Steven Block for his criticisms and corrections. As ever, Karen Ferree and Smita Singh
deserve much of the credit for this work. I also wish to thank Matthew Hindeman and
Marcus Alexander for their technical assistance. The author alone is to be blamed for its
shortcomings.Political reform 349
and expression, for example – and political rights – such as the right to
vote and campaign for ofﬁce – I join with Ottaway (1997), Ihonovbere
(1998), and others (e.g. Hutchful 1997)) in distinguishing between democ-
ratization and reform, and focus solely on the latter.1
To trace the trajectory of political reform, I turn to the standard chroni-
cles2 and for forty-six countries over a twenty-six year period (1970–95) I
ask:didtheheadofstateinplaceonDecember31ofthatyearpresideover:
  A no-party system – i.e. a political system in which parties were legally
banned and effectively suppressed?
  A single-party system?
  Or a multi-party political system?3
I also ask whether the head of state was – or was not –a military ofﬁcial.
Politicalreforminvolvesthetransitionfromano-orsingle-partytoamulti-
party political system, or from a military to a civilian regime.
1 Background
In the course of their strategic retreat from the continent, imperial gov-
ernments ﬁrst granted power to local legislatures, then shared power with
cabinets that included local politicians, and ﬁnally surrendered power to
localexecutives.Theseexecutivesthenbrieﬂygovernedtheirnationsbefore
the devolution of full sovereignty. The culmination of each step was the
introductionofelectionsinwhichrivalpartiesputforwardcompetingcan-
didatesforofﬁce.Inthelastfewyearsbeforeindependence,ratherthanbeing
selected by a bureaucrat, the legislator or executive was instead chosen by a
local electorate.
Inacarefulstudyofpoliticalchangeintwenty-sixfrancophoneandanglo-
phonepolitiesinAfrica,RuthBernsCollier(1982)reportsthatinthisperiod
of self-government, nine of these countries formed a single-party system.
“In most,” she writes, “the overwhelming electoral victory of a single party
or the [voluntary] merger of two parties into one made it possible for that
party effectively to eliminate all competition” (Collier 1982: 95). In these
1 This distinction also implies that the measure of political reform overlooks the quality of
multi-party competition; that is, whether elections were free and fair.
2 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Country Proﬁles of the Economist Intelligence Unit, Africa
Research Bulletin, Africa Contemporary Record, Africa Conﬁdential, and Africa South of the
Sahara.
3 The category “competitive political system” includes both multi-party systems and
systems where party competition was legal but did not take place. The latter category
contained too few observations (twenty-one) to support meaningful analysis.350 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 10.1 The sample set of forty-six countries.
1. Angola
2. Benin
3. Botswana
4. Burkina Faso
5. Burundi
6. Cameroon
7. Cape Verde
8. CAR
9. Chad
10. Comoros
11. Congo, Republic
12. Cˆ ote d’Ivoire
13. Djibouti
14. DRC
15. Equatorial Guinea
16. Ethiopia
17. Gabon
18. The Gambia
19. Ghana
20. Guinea
21. Guinea-Bissau
22. Kenya
23. Lesotho
24. Liberia
25. Madagascar
26. Malawi
27. Mali
28. Mauritania
29. Mauritius
30. Mozambique
31. Namibia
32. Niger
33. Nigeria
34. Rwanda
35. S˜ ao Tom´ e&P rincipe
36. Senegal
37. Seychelles
38. Sierra Leone
39. Somalia
40. Sudan
41. Swaziland
42. Tanzania
43. Togo
44. Uganda
45. Zambia
46. Zimbabwe
nine countries, then, multi-party competition came to an end even before
independence.
In the post-independence period, seven more of Collier’s sample of
twenty-sixstatesadoptedsingle-partysystems:“Inmostofthese,”shewrites,
“theone-partystatesdidnotresultfromelectoralvictoryormergerbutfrom
the banning of all opposition parties or the outright rigging of elections”
(Collier 1982: 95).4
Within three years after independence, a new form of authoritarian-
ism emerged. In the early 1960s, the armies of Benin, Madagascar, Sudan,
Togo, and Congo (Brazzaville) overthrew their civilian leaders. In the
forty-six-country sample employed for the present study (see table 10.1),
by 1970, only nine – or 25 percent of those that had achieved political
independence – retained competitive systems.
Table10.2presentsthedistributionofthetypesofpartysystemsthatpre-
vailed over the sample period (1970–95). Table 10.3 portrays the incidence
of military rule. To be noted is that the two are correlated (see table 10.4),
with the great majority of military rulers presiding over no-party systems.
Thelate1970smarkedthepeakperiodofmilitaryrule(table10.3);thelate
1980s that of single-party systems (table 10.2). Overall, until the mid-1990s
the majority of the African governments were authoritarian: on average, a
4 Fora no verview of the formation of single-party regimes, see Coleman and Rosberg
(1964).Political reform 351
Table 10.2 Nature of party system, 1970–1995.
Distribution of country-years
Time period No-party One-party Multi-party Total
1970–4
Number 70 83 28 181
% 38.67 45.86 15.47 100.00
1975–9
Number 93 97 25 215
% 43.26 45.12 11.63 100.00
1980–4
Number 75 111 36 222
% 33.78 50.00 16.22 100.00
1985–9
Number 72 110 33 215
% 33.49 51.16 15.35 100.00
1990–5
Number 64 68 127 259
% 24.71 26.25 49.03 100.00
All years
Number 374 469 249 1,092
% 34.25 42.95 22.80 100.00
thirdoftheheadsofstatecamefromthemilitaryandthree-quarterspresided
over no-party or single-party systems.
The period of most rapid change came in the period of political reform:
the late 1980s and early 1990s. In that era, the percent of heads of state
who came from the military fell from 33 percent to 23 percent and the
portion of the chief executives that presided over single-party regimes fell
fromone-halftoone-quarter.Fortheﬁrsttimeinthesampleperiod(1970–
95),multi-partypoliticalsystemsbecamethemodalformofgovernmentin
SSA.
Throughout this book, we partition the cases into three “growth oppor-
tunity” categories: landlocked and resource-scarce, coastal and resource-
scarce, and resource-rich (see table 10.5 and chapter 2). Doing so here,
we ﬁnd that throughout most of the sample period, no-party government
provided the modal form of rule in the landlocked and resource-scarce
regions of Africa; single-party systems held sway in the countries on the
coast. Resource-rich nations proved more variable. When political reform
took place, it struck with particular force in the latter two groups, where
60percentormoreofthesamplesetofcountriesadoptedmulti-partypolit-
ical regimes.352 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 10.3 Military head of state, 1970–1995.
Distribution of country-years
Military head of state?
Time period No Yes Total
1970–4
Number 129 63 192
% 67.19 32.81
1975–9
Number 141 79 220
% 64.09 35.91
1980–4
Number 146 74 220
% 66.36 33.64
1985–9
Number 149 71 220
% 67.73 32.27
1990–5
Number 164 49 213
% 77.00 23.00
Total
Number 729 336 1,065
% 68.45 31.55
Table 10.4 Military rule and the party system.
Type of party system
Distribution of country-years No-party One-party Multi-party All
Chief executive
in military?
No Number 107 372 239 718
%o fs ystems 14.90 51.81 33.29 100.00
%o fe xecs 29.32 82.48 98.35
Yes Number 258 79 4 341
%o fs ystems 75.66 23.17 1.17 100.00
%o fe xecs 70.68 17.52 1.65
Total Number 365 451 243 1,059
%o fs ystems 34.47 42.59 22.95 100.00
%o fe xecs 100.00 100.00 100.00Political reform 353
Table 10.5 Partys ystem, by opportunity group, 1970–1994
A 1970–4 and 1975–9
Time period
1970–4 1975–9
Distribution of
country-years
No-
party
Single-
party Multi-party Total No-party
Single-
party Multi-party Total
Landlocked
Number 36 23 1 60 45 14 2 51
% 60.0 38.33 1.67 73.8 23.0 3.28
Coastal
Number 27 45 19 91 32 68 17 117
% 29.7 49.5 20.9 27.35 58.1 14.5
Resource-rich
Number 7 15 8 30 16 15 6 37
% 23.3 50.0 26.67 43.2 40.5 16.2
Total
Number 70 83 28 181 93 97 25 215
% 38.7 45.9 15.47 43.3 45.1 11.6
Notes:T he classiﬁcation by opportunity group applies to country-years and is time-
varying.Here“landlocked”and“coastal”refertocountry-yearsthatarenotonlygeogra-
phically either landlocked or coastal, but also resource-scarce by the criteria developed
in chapter 2.R esource-rich country-years refer to geographically landlocked or coastal
countries in which natural-resource exports pass various thresholds (see chapter 2).
B 1980–4 and 1985–9
Time period
1980–4 1985–9
Distribution of
country-years
No-
party
Single-
party Multi-party Total No-party
Single-
party Multi-party Total
Landlocked
Number 34 21 10 65 33 27 5 65
% 52.3 32.1 15.4 50.8 41.5 7.69
Coastal
Number 25 70 17 112 15 67 23 105
% 22.3 62.5 15.2 14.3 63.8 21.9
Resource-rich
Number 16 20 9 45 24 16 5 45
% 35.6 44.4 20.0 53.3 35.6 11.1
Total
Number 75 111 36 272 72 110 33 215
% 33.8 50 16.2 33.5 51.2 15.4
Notes: See table 10.5, panel A.354 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
C 1990–4
Time period
1990–4
No-party Single-party Multi-party Total
Distribution of
country-years
Landlocked
Number 30 24 24 78
% 38.5 36.8 30.8
Coastal
Number 19 38 61 118
% 16.1 32.2 51.7
Resource-rich
Number 15 6 42 63
% 23.8 9.52 66.67
Total
Number 64 68 127 259
% 24.7 26.3 49
Notes: See table 10.5, panel A.
2 Explaining political reform
Intheirattemptstoaccountforthechangefromauthoritarianformsofgov-
ernment, scholars have advanced two major explanations. One emphasizes
the role of global forces and in particular the role of donors and ﬁnan-
cial institutions. The second stresses the importance of political forces that
operate within Africa.
2.1 The international path
AsnotedinNdulu’schapter9,bytheendofthe1970s,theinternationalcom-
munity was fully aware of the failure of African development. Emboldened
by thereformistmandatebestowedbyitsPresident,RobertMcNamara,the
WorldBankhadﬁnancedadazzlingarrayofsmall-farmerandcommunity-
level projects. As recounted in its ofﬁcial history, the World Bank’s own
evaluations revealed a distressingly low rate of return for its Africa projects:
“More than any other task the Bank had undertaken, its engagement with
Sub-SaharanAfricasappedtheinstitution’s...conﬁdence,”itreports(Kapur
1997: 720). When seeking reasons for the failure of its projects, the Bank
foundthemin“thepolicyenvironment.”Asdocumentedinitsfamed“Berg
Report,”5 Africa’seconomiesweresubjecttoamixofpoliciesthatdistortedPolitical reform 355
marketpricesandunderminedeconomicincentivesandsocrippledgrowth
and development.
In addition to being a ﬁnancer of projects, the World Bank then became
an advisor to governments. In pursuit of policy change, it drew upon
two sources of strength. The ﬁrst was expertise. Through publications,
seminars, and the training of public servants, the Bank sought to expose
the economic costs of prevailing policies and to offer alternatives. The
second was capital. In any given country at any given time, the Bank would
normally ﬁnance a multitude of projects, the cancellation of any one of
which would go largely unnoticed by the national government. To gain the
attention of policy-makers, Please (1984) writes, the Bank therefore began
to bundle its projects into sectoral programs; more would then be at risk
were the Bank to suspend its lending. Sectoral programs soon gave way to
country programs and to conditionality, as the Bank sought to strengthen
further its leverage over policy-makers in debtor nations and to sharpen
the incentives for policy reform.
The World Bank was but one of several sources of ﬁnance, however;
privatebanks,bilateraldonorsandincreasinglytheIMFalsoprovidedcredit
to African governments. In pursuit of power, the Bank therefore sought to
build coalitions among creditors. Given international realities, however,
a united front proved difﬁcult to achieve. In the midst of the Cold War,
the USA, for example, simply refused to join any coalition threatening to
suspendaidtoMobutu,whowasprovidingarmsandbasestothoseﬁghting
Marxists in Angola. And when the USA might pursue collective efforts to
elicit changes in socialist countries, other nations – those in Scandinavia,
for example – would then breach the creditors’ alliance out of ideological
sympathy or humanitarian concerns.
As donors focused on the behavior of African governments, they neces-
sarily struggled with the question: why would these governments adopt
policies that undermined economic prosperity? Over time, a consensus
emerged: that the behavior of these governments reﬂected their lack of
politicalaccountability.Notbeingaccountable,governmentsinAfricacould
adoptpoliciesthatconferredconcentratedbeneﬁtsontheeliteswhileimpos-
ingwidelydistributedcostsonthosewhogeneratedthewealthofthenation.
In its pursuit of ways to alter the economic environment faced by private
agents in Africa’s economies, the World Bank therefore began to focus not
only on policy choices but also on institutional reform.6
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, changes at the global level strength-
ened the hand of Africa’s creditors. Under the presidency of Ronald Rea-
gan, the USA vigorously backstopped the efforts of international ﬁnancial
5 World Bank (1981). 6 See, for example, World Bank (1989, 1991).356 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
institutions to reduce the role of governments and to strengthen that of
markets in the developing countries. The collapse of the Labour Party and
theeleven-yearruleofMargaretThatcheralignedBritain’sagendawiththat
of the USA. And after the fall of the Labor government in Norway in 1981
andtheSocialDemocraticgovernmentadecadelater,Africangovernments
seeking to resist reforms could no longer count on support from the Scan-
dinavian countries.
The fundamental change came, however, with the collapse of commu-
nism. The new democracies in middle-income Europe now had a stronger
claim on international assistance than did the impoverished authoritarian
regimes of Africa. The ability of the international ﬁnancial community to
elicit institutional reform rose accordingly.
The “international” explanation of political reform thus focuses on the
place of Africa within the global system and stresses the role of foreign
creditors and international capital. There exists a second account, however,
whichIlabelthe“domestic”narrative.Bywayofintroduction,considerthe
wordso fA du Boahen, a long-term challenger of Ghana’s military regimes:
“Adu Boahen [sic] was detained...f o r[ m y ]r o l ei n...campaigns for the
reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Ghana . . . long before anybody
heard of Mikhail Gorbachev or of World Bank and IMF conditionalities”
(Boahen 1997: 146). Boahen’s indignation imparts weight to his claim that
the source of political change lay in the townships of Africa rather than in
the ofﬁces of the international ﬁnancial community.
2.2 The domestic path
With the decline of Africa’s economies in the 1970s came the erosion of
governmentrevenuesandthequalityoftheservicesthattheycouldprovide.
When Sahr Kpundeh examined the pay slip of Freetown’s Commissioner
of Taxes, for example, he noted a monthly salary of Le 13,941.00.7 “If [the
Commissioner] buys a bag of rice at Le 8,200 . . . every month to feed his
family,” Kpundeh wrote, “and pays Le 300 for transportation to and from
work every day, . . . his expenses exceed his earnings” (Kpundeh 2004: 67).
The Commissioner’s response, Kpundeh reports, was to devote less time to
collectingthepublic’srevenuesandtodevotemoretogeneratinganincome
for himself and his family (2004: 67).
MacGaffey (1991: 14) ﬁnds similar patterns in the DRC. Drawing on a
survey of household ﬁnances in Kinshasa, she notes that over two-thirds of
the expenditures made by public employees went to the purchase of food
and that the portion had increased in recent years while that spent on meat
7 US $28 (!) at the time of writing.Political reform 357
and ﬁsh had declined. The ﬁrst, she stresses, is the mark of poverty; the
second, of immiseration.
Inresponsetotheerosionintheirsalaries,governmentworkersexitedthe
public domain and turned to private economic activity.8 They also joined
the ranks of those who opposed the governments that employed them.
Côted’Ivoireoffersanaptexample.Duringtherecessionofthe1970s,its
economy was fortuitously buoyed by favorable prices for coffee and cocoa,
its principal exports. In 1978, however, these prices, too, declined – just
as petroleum prices doubled. During the export boom, the government
had launched massive development programs in the North, a region long
disgruntled by its marginal position in the forest-based economy. The bills
for this expansion came due just as the capacity to ﬁnance them declined
and the government sought to retrench. As stated by Rapley (1993: 58–9),
the
austerity program hit with particular force on the civil servants, who found their
budgetsfrozen;theirprogramscut;andtheirsalariesleftunpaid.Inresponse,public
servants turned on the government that employed them: transport workers closed
down bus lines, workers disrupted the supply of electricity to Abidjan, the national
capital, and airport employees closed down the national airport (see also Faure
1989).
Forpublicservants,theeconomiccollapseofthestaterepresentedathreat
toprivateincomes;forprivatecitizens,itresultedinalossofpublicservices.
Clinics were left without medicines, as governments could not afford to
import them – or as the staff would sell them to supplement their meager
wages. Schools were left without textbooks, and teachers often spent as
much time in commerce as they did in instruction. Private traders faced
increased costs from the decay of the roads, the inefﬁciency of the harbors,
andtheextractionofbribes.Telephonefacilitiesdecayedandpostalworkers
trimmed their hours to ﬁt their pay. Many in the private sector therefore
turned from activities that made extensive use of public services to those
that did not, shifting from production for exchange into self-sufﬁciency.
Many alsojoinedindemandsforpoliticalreform(BrattonandvandeWalle
1997).
Twoa ccounts thus lead to the same end: protests against authoritarian
rule.Inseveralcountries,theoppositionorganizednationalconferencesthat
transformed military governments into civilian regimes and uncompetitive
into competitive party systems. In 1990, Benin became the ﬁrst to convene
such a conference. Seeking to emulate Benin’s achievements, reformers in
8 By the mid-1980s, MacGaffey (1991) notes, salaries constituted less than one-half of the
incomes of those who worked in the public sector.358 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
neighboringstatesthenorganizedconferencesoftheirown.Awaveofpoliti-
calreformspreadﬁrstthroughWestAfricaandtheninlandandtothesouth,
encompassing both French- and English-speaking states.9
3 Empirics
To deepen our understanding of political reform, we turn from qualitative
accountstoquantitativedatadrawnfromforty-sixcountriesovertheperiod
1970–95 (see table 10.1).
The most straightforward way of exploring the patterns described in
section 2 would be to estimate the entries in a transition matrix that would
represent the probability of a political system enduring from one period
to the next or of altering in form. The paucity of information confounds
thisapproach,however.Giventhehighdegreeofpersistenceinthepolitical
systems of Africa, the number of informative observations is small. Even
whenapplyingtechniquesdesignedfortheinvestigationofrareevents(King
andZeng2001),Ihavebeenunabletosecurepreciseestimatesoftheimpact
of key variables upon the likelihood of such transitions.
RatherthanemployingMarkovmodelstoexploretransitions,Itherefore
rely upon probit and logit estimation. Both treat the dependent variable as
ab inary variable. A country then is either reformed and thus 1, or authori-
tarian and thus 0.
Ih aveo ffered two interpretations of the process of reform, one based on
international forces and the other on those within Africa. To capture the
ﬁrst, I include a measure of AID, or more precisely, aid dependence; the
variable represents the value of international grants measured as a percent
of the central government’s budget. Designating with a dummy variable
all observations recorded after 1988, I distinguish the period after the Cold
War;IcallthisvariablePOST-1988.Thedependentvariableisthelikelihood
of abandoning authoritarian forms of government. Insofar as international
factors shaped the process of reform, the coefﬁcients on these variables
should be positive in sign and statistically signiﬁcant.
Itwasbyallaccountstheliterate,urban-based,middleclassthatprovided
the impetus for political reform. Insofar as reform stemmed from sources
internal to Africa, then the likelihood of reform should be signiﬁcantly
and positively related to (the log of) per capita INCOME, to the percent
of the adult population that could read or write (LITERACY), and to the
percentage living in urban areas (URBAN POPULATION). The inﬂuence
of local sources of reform should also become evident in the relationship
betweenUNRESTandreform.UNRESTregisterswhethertherewerereports
9 It will be noticed that South Africa is excluded from this part of the analysis.Political reform 359
ofmassdemonstrationsinanygivenyear(1)andwhether,ifso,theybecame
violent (2). It should also become evident in the relationship between the
likelihoodofreforminonecountryandthelevelofreforminitsneighbors,
with the latter being captured in a variable called NEIGHBORHOOD.
Both the “international” and “domestic” accounts of reform emphasize
the role of economic decline, be it of the private economy or of public
services;IthereforeincludeGROWTHandpublicREVENUESintheequa-
tions. To control for the strong inertial property of political arrangements,
I also include a measure of the “stock” of political institutions. The variable
DURATIONindicatesthenumberofyearsinwhichtheincumbentpolitical
system – be it no-party, one-party or multi-party – has been in place.
A major difﬁculty confronting these attempts at estimation is the preva-
lence of missing values in the data.10 Resorting to case-wise deletion – that
is, to dropping observations which lack data for key variables – decreases
the efﬁciency and increases the potential for bias in the estimates. I there-
fore employ the methods developed by Rubin (1996) and Schafer (1997)
to impute multiple estimates of the missing values and to calculate their
distributions, and the techniques developed by the Harvard Data Center to
estimate and to interpret the estimates derived from the resultant data.11
Another difﬁculty is the possible signiﬁcance of omitted variables, which
could either cause spurious relationships or endogeneity. To counter those
possibilities I introduce ﬁxed effects and instrumental variables.
Table 10.6 provides a description of the variables, their distribution, and
the sources from which they were taken. Table 10.7 contains the probit
estimates drawn from pooled samples and table 10.8 conditional logit esti-
mates that allow for country-speciﬁc effects. In each table, (2) and (4)
employ the composite score, MODERNITY rather than INCOME, LIT-
ERACY AND URBAN POPULATION. The variable NEIGHBORHOOD
registers the average level of political reform in the neighboring states.
In both tables 10.7 and 10.8, the coefﬁcients relate the value of the inde-
pendent variables to the likelihood of reform. In column (1) and (2), the
dependentvariabletakesthevalueof1ifthecountrypossessesamulti-party
politicalsystemand0otherwise.Incolumn(3)and(4),thedependentvari-
abletakesthevalue1ifthegovernmentisheadedbyamilitaryofﬁcialand0
otherwise. In all equations, the standard errors are robust and clustered by
country. The values of all right-hand-side variables are lagged by one year.
The estimates document the inertial property of political institutions
and the tendency of institutions to persist; in so doing, they also high-
light the magnitude of the challenge that faced the reformers. In col-
umn (1) and (2) in table 10.7, the coefﬁcients on the duration indicators
10 This will come as no surprise to anyone who studies Africa. See Honaker (2000).
11 King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).360 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 10.6 Description of variables used in tables 10.7 and 10.9.
Variable name Deﬁnition/Units Mean
Standard
error of
mean
Dependent variables:
MULTI-PARTY 1 if multi-party system, de facto
or de jure;0otherwise
0.208 0.406
MILITARY 1 if chief executive a military
ofﬁcial; 0 otherwise
0.441 0.479
Explanatory variables:
INCOME log of GDP per capita (PPP) 6.851 0.605
LITERACY Percent of adult population
literate
58.917 19.921
URBAN
POPULATION
Percent of population living in
cities
25.849 13.476
MODERNITY Factor score derived from
principal components factor
analysis of INCOME, URBAN
POPULATION, AND
LITERACY
 1.6 E-02 0.024
GROWTH Annual rate of growth of GDP 0.152 8.290
REVENUES Central government revenues as
percent of GDP
19.486 10.165
AID International grants as percent of
central government budget
53.643 68.934
OIL Dollar value of oil exports
per capita
86.071 473.730
DURATION:
No-party Length of time NO-PARTY
system in place (see below)
2.405 4.685
Single-party Length of time SINGLE-PARTY
system in place (see below)
3.415 5.551
Multi-party Length of time MULTI-PARTY
system in place (see above)
1.271 3.934
NO-PARTY 1 if chief executive achieves
power without an election;
0 otherwise
0.313 0.463
SINGLE PARTY 1 if chief executive elected to
ofﬁce but faced no opposition
party
0.392 0.483
NEIGHBORHOOD Average level of reform in
neighboring states
2.741 1.112
POST-1988 1 if year 1988–95; 0 otherwise 0.269 0.444Political reform 361
Table 10.7 Probit estimation of covariates of reform.
Dependent variable
MULTI-PARTY political
system MILITARY rule
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
INCOME 0.287 –  1.317 –
(1.600) – ( 7.176)    –
LITERACY 0.011 –  0.007 –
(2.302)   –(  2.315)   –
URBAN POPULATION 0.008 – 0.018 –
(1.440) – (3.892)    –
MODERNITY – 0.440 –  0.518
– (3.315)    –(  5.264)   
GROWTH 0.008 1.361  0.002  0.009
(1.191) (0.174) ( 0.257) ( 1.400)
REVENUES  0.009  0.007  0.033  0.042
( 0.649) ( 0.532) ( 3.718)    ( 4.667)   
AID  0.004  0.005  0.007  0.005
( 1.726)  ( 2.049)   ( 3.090)    ( 2.026) 
OIL  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
( 1.286) ( 1.682)  (1.771)  (0.180)
UNREST  0.007  0.001 0.007 0.028
( 0.105) ( 0.022) (0.139) (0.556)
DURATION:
No-party  0.010  0.099 0.103 0.101
( 4.383)    ( 4.323)    (6.571)    (6.961)   
Single-party  0.105  0.103  0.029  0.014
( 4.8)    ( 4.689)    ( 2.207)   ( 1.173)
Multi-party 0.243 0.245  0.022  0.060
(2.006)   (2.023)   ( 0.443) ( 1.172)
NEIGHBORHOOD 0.174 0.161  0.216  0.108
(2.927)    (2.728)    ( 3.768)    ( 2.079)  
POST-1988 1.132 1.185  0.125  0.016
(7.452)    (8.249)    ( 0.851) ( 0.120)
No.o bs. 1,088 1,088 1,088 1,088
Note: t-statistic in parentheses.  =0.10 conﬁdence level;    =0.05 conﬁdence level;
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Table 10.8 Conditional ﬁxed-effects estimation of covariates of reform.
Dependent variable
MULTI-PARTY political
system MILITARY rule
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
INCOME 1.139 –  2.552 –
(1.461) – ( 3.815)    –
LITERACY 0.024 – 0.013 –
(0.963) – (0.599) –
URBAN POPULATION 0.091 – 0.009 –
(1.655) – (0.254) –
MODERNITY – 2.288 –  1.266
– (3.117)    –(  1.958) 
GROWTH 0.017 0.013  0.008  0.022
(0.982) (0.777) ( 0.502) ( 1.556)
REVENUES  0.009  0.010  0.004  0.010
( 0.279) ( 0.304) ( 0.158) ( 0.420)
AID  0.008  0.007  0.004  0.001
( 1.216) ( 1.104) ( 0.803) ( 0.229)
OIL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.326) (0.293) (0.306) (0.213)
UNREST  0.034  0.029 0.140 0.165
( 0.209) ( 0.178) (0..967) (1.225)
DURATION:
No-party  0.152  0.151 0.298 0.317
( 2.905)    ( 2.945)    (6.011)    (6.535)   
Single-party  0.147  0.146  0.107  0.082
( 3.793)    ( 3.838)    ( 2.390)   ( 1.931) 
Multi-party 0.529 0.515  0.031  0.097
(4.001)   (3.925)    ( 0.246) ( 0.723)
NEIGHBORHOOD 0.366 0.384  0.597  0.454
(2.017)   (2.255)   ( 3.791)    ( 3.046)   
POST-1988 1.683 1.826  0.977  0.437
(3.551)    (4.146)    ( 2.255)   ( 1.210)
No. obs. 710 710 710 710
Note: t-statistic in parentheses.  =0.10 conﬁdence level;    =0.05 conﬁdence level;    =0.01 conﬁdence
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forno-andsingle-partysystemsarehighlysigniﬁcant;12asseenintable10.8,
they remain signiﬁcant even after the introduction of ﬁxed effects. Return-
ing to table 10.7, notice, too, the coefﬁcients on government REVENUES:
all are negative and, for military governments, they are highly signiﬁcant.
Governmentswithhigherrevenuesweremorelikelytobecivilianthanwere
those that lacked ﬁnancial resources. As seen in table 10.8, the signs but
not the signiﬁcance levels persist in the ﬁxed-effects, conditional logistic
estimations.
The estimates in tables 10.7 and 10.8 provide support for the “domestic”
path toward political reform. In both, the greater the percent of the adult
population who were literate (LITERACY) and the higher the average (log
of) INCOME, the more likely were authoritarian regimes to fall. In the
estimates that incorporate ﬁxed effects (table 10.8), the coefﬁcients on the
individual components of modernity become insigniﬁcant; evidence for
the broader argument nonetheless remains the coefﬁcient on the aggregate
measure,MODERNITY,whichisstatisticallysigniﬁcantandoftheexpected
sign.13 The data also conﬁrm the importance of political contagion within
Africa. As seen in the coefﬁcient on NEIGHBORHOOD, the higher the
average level of political reform in surrounding countries, the greater the
likelihood of reform in a given nation. Unexpectedly, the level of domestic
UNREST bears little relationship to the outcome of the struggle for reform.
Inspectionofthedataindicatesthatthelevelofunrestwashighincountries
where reform triumphed (e.g. Benin) as well as in countries where it failed
(e.g. Togo). Authoritarian governments appear to have fallen not because
they faced more unrest but because they were unable to respond to it
Turning to the indicators of international forces, interesting differences
emerge between the two kinds of reform: the movement to MULTI-PARTY
politicalsystemsandfromMILITARYtociviliangovernment.Intables10.7
and 10.8, the coefﬁcient on POST-1988, the dummy variable marking the
post-Cold War period, shifts positively and signiﬁcantly for the movement
toacompetitivepoliticalsystem(table10.7).Inthecaseofmilitaryregimes,
the coefﬁcient on POST-1988 is insigniﬁcant in three of the four equations:
thetopplingofmilitarygovernmentsfailedtoaccelerateaftertheColdWar.
The late-century increase in the number of competitive regimes resulted
more from the fall of single-party systems than it did from the fall of no-
party (and therefore largely military) systems.14
12 That the coefﬁcients on no-party systems are positive in (3) and (4) merely re-conﬁrms
that military governments tend to form no-party regimes.
13 Recall that the variable MODERNITY is derived from a principle components analysis of
INCOME, LITERACY, and URBAN POPULATION.
14 Interacting the period dummy with the “stock” of different kinds of governments
conﬁrms that it was the no-party systems that tended to become competitive in the
post-war period; the no-party systems – the regimes of choice for military governments –
behaved no differently in this respect in the periods before and after 1988.364 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
The data suggest that AID dependence played a different role in the two
kindsoftransitions.Theprobitestimatescomputedfromthepooledsample
(column (1) and (2) in table 10.7)s uggest that higher levels of aid depen-
dence rendered no- and single-party governments less likely to transition
to multi-party political regimes. The signs but not the signiﬁcance levels
persist in the conditional logit (ﬁxed effects) estimates (column (1) and (2)
in table 10.8). By contrast, in all models, higher levels of aid dependence
renderedthetransitionfrommilitaryrulemorelikely(column(3)and(4)in
tables 10.7 and 10.8). Aid dependence thus appears to have played a greater
role in the transition from military government to civilian rule than it did
in the transition from no- or single- to multi-party systems.
NotethecoefﬁcientsonOILincolumn(2)and(3)intable10.7.Inkeeping
with the literature on the “resource curse” (Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner
1999),thecoefﬁcientsuggeststhatgovernmentsblessedwithanabundance
of natural resources may be more likely to be authoritarian. But note also
the coefﬁcient in column (3) and (4): the greater the access to oil revenues,
the less likely the government is military.
Ap roblem confronting the estimates reported in tables 10.7 and 10.8 is
thepossibleimpactofreciprocalcausation:GROWTHorREVENUEScould
be affected by changes in political regime, for example, and the estimates
therefore need to be corrected for the impact of endogeneity. Particularly
whenestimatingequationsthatincludequalitativedependentvariablesand
multipledatasets,itprovesdifﬁculttocorrectforthissourceofbias.Suitable
techniques15 exist only for probit estimation. When addressing the prob-
lem of endogeneity, I used for instruments lagged values of the endogenous
variables,therateofgrowthoftheOECDeconomies,thepercentofexports
comprisingprimaryproducts,andthepercentoftaxrevenuesderivedfrom
international trade. The coefﬁcients on most variables remained virtually
unchanged. Not surprisingly, given the volatility of short-run growth rates,
the coefﬁcients for the instrumented values of GROWTH were poorly esti-
mated.ThoseforREVENUESweremorepreciseandsuggestthattheuncor-
rected estimates understate the impact of government revenues on political
stability by roughly 50 percent.
It is useful to shift our focus from the sign and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁ-
cients to an assessment of their magnitude. The data in table 10.9 provide
estimates of the magnitude of the change in the likelihood of reform that is
associated with a change in the magnitude of a given independent variable,
while the other such variables are held at their median values. Recall that
“reform” refers to the movement to ac o m p etitive party system and away
15 “Suitable” implies, among other things, that the technique can be applied to multiple
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Table 10.9 Political reform (ﬁrst differences).
Dependent variable
Multi-party rule Multi-party rule Military rule Military rule
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
INCOME 0.045 –  0.275 –
Lowest   highest ( 0.008 0.110) – ( 0.348 0.202) –
LITERACY 0.080 –  0.073 –
Lowest   highest (0.017 0.171) – ( 0.131 0.002) –
URBAN POPULATION 0.033 – 0.101 –
Lowest   highest ( 0.01 0.086) – (0.051 0.152) –
MODERNIZATION – 0.105 –  0.162
Lowest   highest – (0.04 0.187) – ( 0.223
 0.106)
GROWTH 0.016 0.017  0.005  0.024
Lowest   highest ( 0.01 0.043) ( 0.007 0.044) ( 0.038 0.032) ( 0.507 0.10)
REVENUES  0.024 0.018  0.121  0.147
Lowest   highest ( 0.008 0.044) ( 0.007 0.048) ( 0.179 0.061) ( 0.202
 0.091)
AID  0.045  0.051  0.105  0.071
Lowest   highest ( 0.103 0.003) ( 0.106 0.044) ( 0.181 0.046) ( 0.148
 0.015)
OIL 0.0 0 0 0
Lowest   highest (0.0 0.0) (0.0 0.0) (0.0 0.0) (0.0 0.0)
UNREST  0.002 0.001 0.006 0.019
0   1(  0.060 0.065) ( 0.054 0.069) ( 0.060 0.076) ( 0.044
0.085)
DURATION:
NO-PARTY  0.023  0.022 0.035 0.033
0   1(  0.042 0.009) ( 0.04  0.09) (0.026 0.043) (0.025 0.040)
SINGLE-PARTY  0.024  0.023  0.009  0.005
0   1(  0.044 0.010) ( 0.042 0.009) ( 0.019 0.001) ( 0.012
0.002)
COMPETITIVE 0.062 0.061  0.008  0.019
0   1 (0.001 0.111) (0.003 0.109) ( 0.041 0.024) ( 0.052
0.012)
NEIGHBORHOOD 0.050 0.045  0.083  0.041
Lowest   highest (0.018 0.086) (0.015 0.078) ( 0.127 0.041) ( 0.08
 0.002)
POST-1988 0.386 0.402  0.037  0.004
0   1 (0.278 0.492) (0.294 0.503) ( 0.117 0.053) ( 0.082
0.089)
Note: “Lowest   highest” indicates a movement from the lowest to the highest quartile, i.e. over the
interquartile range. In the case of POST-1998, 0   1 indicates a movement from before to after. In the case
of the DURATION variables, 0   1r epresents an increase of an additional year. The values in parentheses
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fromamilitaryregime.FortheDURATIONvariables,theestimatesindicate
the impact of an additional year of a no- or single-party system or a multi-
party political regime. For the POST-1988 dummy, the change ranges from
0t o1– i.e. from before to after the Cold War. For the other variables, the
value is changed from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the sample values.
The results in column (1) suggest that if a country like Liberia (which is
in the lowest quartile) could increase its literacy rate to that of Zimbabwe
(which is in the highest), then the likelihood of adopting a competitive
political system would increase by 8 percentage points (with the 5 percent
conﬁdence interval of 0.017 to 0.171 percent). Those in column (3) sug-
gest that had the central government of Chad (which in 1974 occupied the
75thpercentile)derivedassmallapercentofitsrevenuesfrominternational
grants as did Mauritius (which occupied the 25th), then the likelihood of
Chad adopting a civilian regime would have increased by 11 percentage
points (with the 5 percent conﬁdence interval of 4.6 to 18.1 percent). Inter-
estingly, it is the end of the Cold War that appears to have had the greatest
effectuponthechangetoacompetitivepoliticalsystem.Forthechangefrom
military to civilian regimes, the major force appears to have been internal
rather than global in origin, with the so-called “modernization” variables
havingthegreatesteffect.Inbothcases,AIDdependencyappears,however,
to have accelerated the reform of military regimes.
4 The impact of political reform
While champions of political reform viewed it as good in itself, they also
vieweditasameansforsecuringeconomicreform.Beingunconstrainedby
the need to compete for popular support, it was argued, authoritarian gov-
ernmentsweremorelikelytoengageineconomicpredation.Theywereless
likely to govern with economic restraint and therefore prone to distort key
prices in the macroeconomy: the exchange rate, the interest rate, the aggre-
gatepricelevel.SuchargumentswerechampionedbothbyAfricanintellec-
tuals who posited a link between poor governance and poverty (Ake 1990)
andbyinternationaldonorswhoincreasinglyviewedpoliticalaccountability
as a necessary precondition for economic reform (World Bank 1994).
In this section, I explore and evaluate the logic of this argument.16 In
doingso,Iﬁndthatwhilepoliticalaccountabilityappearstorelatetoreduced
opportunismbygovernments,itfailstorelatetoour(lessthanperfect!)mea-
sureofmacroeconomicrestraint.Insubsequentsections,Ithereforeexplore
thepossibilitythatpoliticalaccountabilityfailsbecausepoliticalcompetition
creates incentives for governments to manipulate the macroeconomy for
short-term political advantage.
16 More accurately, Macartan Humphreys and I: see Humphreys and Bates (2005).Political reform 367
4.1 Political accountability
Usingaprincipal–agentframework,Barro(1973),Ferejohn(1986),Persson
and Tabellini (2000), and others (see Besley 2006)h a v ec r afted models of
political accountability and derived from them the equilibrium behavior of
governments. In this section, I employ such a model in order to explore
the link between political reform in Africa and the policy choices of its
governments.
In models of political accountability, the citizens move ﬁrst, choosing a
minimum level of acceptable performance by their government. Knowing
how the citizens have chosen, the government then chooses public policies,
seeking to offer sufﬁcient beneﬁts to win renewal in power and to secure
private beneﬁts from ofﬁce that are consistent with its retention of ofﬁce.
After its term has been completed, the citizens evaluate the government’s
performance. If some decisive group of citizens approves – a group that we
call the selectorate – the citizenry may choose to renew the government’s
contract.Iftheselectoratefailstodoso,thegovernmentdepartsfromofﬁce
andanotherisinstalledinitsplace.Thegamebetweenthecitizensandtheir
governmentisplayedoveraninﬁnitenumberofperiodsofﬁxedlength;each
player’s valuation of utility is given by the sum of welfare in each period,
discounted for risk and time.
One way of securing greater accountability is to compel those who seek
ofﬁce to compete for the votes of the electorate. One step toward reform,
then,isthechangefromamilitarytoacivilianregime.Anotherisintroduc-
ing multi-party systems where single- and no-party (i.e. nakedly authori-
tarian) systems had hitherto held sway. As we shall see, there exists an equi-
librium for this game in which the strategy followed by citizens compels
the government to produce more public goods and fewer private beneﬁts
thanitmightotherwisedesire,andinwhichawiderselectorate(alargerM)
increasesthequalityofpolicyonthemargin.Themodelthusdemonstrates
that institutions of accountability – arrangements that allow the popular
replacement of executives based on performance, or that widen the selec-
torate – can generate incentives that inﬂuence economic policy in the ways
claimed by political reformers. I explore later why they fail in important
respects to do so.
4.2 The economy
In this model, we think of an economy containing N individuals, indexed
by i   {1,2,...,N} in which production is governed by an agent – the
government – that manages the transformation between public goods –
denotedby  –andprivategoods–denotedby  –subjecttotheconstraints
that f ( , )   1and ,    0.Thefunction f ( , )capturestheeasewith
which the agent can transform public into private goods. The income of368 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
each player – the government and all others – is written as yi =   +  i,
where  i denotes individual i’s allocation of the private good and where
 i i =  .T he total income of the economy is  iyi = N ·  ( ) +  .
Along the frontier deﬁned by f ( , ) = 1, the supply of private goods is
implicitly a function of the supply of private goods:   =  ( ). We assume
that production sets are convex, so that      0 and    ,     < 0. We also
assume that   (0) = 0 and that    <  1/N,s o that even the smallest
transformation of public into private goods reduces total income. Under
these conditions, the economy’s income is maximized when the govern-
ment refrains completely from transforming public into private goods. Put
another way, rent-seeking is inefﬁcient.
4.3 The polity
Thegovernment,actingasanagent,implementsasetofpoliciesthatappor-
tions resources between public and private goods. It can retain some of the
private goods for its own consumption (i.e. generate and consume political
rents). Alternatively, it can distribute such goods to inﬂuential followers.
The government is forward-looking and confronts two streams of future
beneﬁts. One is the reward of holding ofﬁce, which it discounts for political
risk and time at rate     [0,1]. The other is the most rewarding alterna-
tive offered in the private sector, the per-period value of which is given by
v, also discounted for time.17 So long as the rewards from holding ofﬁce
exceed those from alternative employment, the government seeks to retain
ofﬁce.
Call the set of principals whose support is sufﬁcient to return the gov-
ernment to ofﬁce the selectorate; the selectorate is a strict sub-set of the
principals and is of ﬁxed size M.Iassume that the government is incapable
ofcrediblycommittingtohonoritspromises.Itisthepoweroftheselectorate
to reward(ortopunish)thegovernmentformeeting(orfailingtomeet)its
expectations that generates incentives for it to adopt particular policies. If a
sufﬁcientnumber,M,ofprincipalschoosesnottore-selectthegovernment–
alternatively,ifthegovernmentfailstosatisfythedemandsofMprincipals–
then the government is dismissed with some positive probability.
4.4 The game
In each period, there are three phases of play. In the ﬁrst, each citizen has
the option unilaterally to selectaminimum satisfaction level, yi =   +  i,
17 We treat v as exogenous and time-invariant and we assume that it is of less value to the
government than the most attractive gains that can be made from the unconstrained use
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that represents the lowest level of performance that she will tolerate before
seeking to dismiss the government. In the second, the government chooses
a mixture of public and private goods and an allocation of the latter
between itself and selected principals. In the third, the principals choose
non-cooperatively whether to take some costless action to return the gov-
ernment to ofﬁce.
Because the government cannot commit, the citizens “vote” retrospec-
tively.Observingthegovernment’sperformanceinofﬁceandapplyingtheir
performance standards, they express or withhold their approval of the gov-
ernment.Ifthemembersoftheselectoratechoosetoreturnthegovernment
to ofﬁce, they succeed in doing so. Should the government fail to satisfy the
selectorate, it remains in power with probabilityq   (0,1); otherwise, with
probability 1   q, the government is dismissed and a new one is installed.
In either case, play returns to the ﬁrst phase in which principals can again
choose performance criteria for the new term of ofﬁce.
Within this framework, I look for an equilibrium in which principals
employ a retrospective voting rule with cutoff points {yi} and the govern-
ment undertakes actions that are feasible; that meet the demands of some
set of M principals; and that leave no reason for any principal to alter her
threshold in an effort to increase her well-being.
4.5 The impact of accountability
In what follows I denote possible allocations of public and private goods by
( ,{ gov,  pri})where{ gov,  pri}describesthedistributionofprivategoods
between the government and private citizens. Note three benchmark values
for public goods provision  .
4.5.1 The government’s ideal
Like all actors in the model, the government seeks to maximize its income
deﬁned over private and public goods. If unconstrained, the government
would appropriate all of the private goods and produce a level  min of
the public good satisfying    =  1.18 The government’s ideal allocation is
therefore
( min,{ ( min),0}).
4.5.2 Participation constraint
As econd benchmark value for  ,w hich I label  max,i s the maximum
value of   (and thus the minimum value of  ) that yields beneﬁts to the
18 Note that  min will always exceed zero because of the properties of the transformation
function, which render it increasingly costly to transform public into private goods.370 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
government that are at least as valuable as those it could gain were it to
chooseopportunisticallyandsufferdismissal.  max setsanupperboundon
the level of collective goods that a government is willing to produce while
seeking to remain in ofﬁce. Assuming that the government consumes all
private goods, this upper bound is given by the largest feasible value of  
that satisﬁes:
  +  ( )  
 
 min +  ( min) +  
     q
1    
 
1    
1    q
,
where  q is the component of the government’s overall discount rate   that
is attributable to the probability of losing ofﬁce.
The proof for this claim is given as Lemma 1 in the published article,
whereitisalsodemonstratedthat max <  min andthat max alwaysexist.19
4.5.3 Feasibility constraint
The government manages the transformation of private into public goods.
Should the government seek to secure ofﬁce by generating private beneﬁts
for the selectorate, it would then have to produce less   and so would
impose losses upon the economy. A third benchmark, then, is the value of
  below which the costs that result from the distortion that arises from the
transformation of public beneﬁts into private goods become too great to
allowthegovernmenttocompensatethepoliticallydecisivesetofMplayers
through private transfers. It is given by the value of   for which the slope
of  ( )i s (M + 1) – or, if no such point exists, by the maximal feasible
supply of public goods, which satisﬁes f ( ,0) = 1. We call this value   ,
the corresponding value of private goods production is    =  (  ). Note
that since     < 0,    >  min.
When   is greater than   , then, the government can ﬁnd M players that
will be willing to accept a reduction in   in exchange for some increase in
  –a n increase which the government can feasibly supply.
4.6 Equilibrium
These benchmark values of   help us to portray the equilibrium of this
game.
Claim:I ti sasub-game perfect stationary equilibrium for each principal, i,t o
demand y 
i =    in each period; for the government to produce (  ,{ (  ,0})
in each period, where    = min(  ,  max); and for the selectorate to re-select the
government.
19 Humphreys and Bates (2005).Political reform 371
In equilibrium therefore, an accountable government satisﬁes its selec-
torate by supplying public goods. In addition, it shirks, producing positive
amounts of private goods and consuming them itself.20 Buti tc onsumes
fewer private goods and produces more public goods than it would do were
it left unaccountable. Moreover, the quality of policy is an increasing func-
tion of the size of the selectorate. A larger M means more public goods
and less diversion of the economy’s resources into the hands of political
incumbents.
Thelogicofthemodelthusconﬁrmstheintuitionofthosewhoadvocate
greater levels of accountability for governments in Africa.
4.7 Testing the model21
The question remains: does accountability work in practice? Has political
reform led to economic reform in Africa? Two measures can be employed
to address this question. Both reﬂect the assessments of informed observers
and both offer insight into the policy choices of governments. The ﬁrst
comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and is produced
by Political Risk Services (PRS).22 Each year, the PRS convenes a panel of
international investors to rate governments on a series of dimensions, each
relevant to the political, economic, and ﬁnancial risks faced by investors.
Fore ach country, our measure, OPPORTUNISM, combines ratings of the
government’s propensity to repudiate its ﬁnancial obligations and its like-
lihood of expropriating private investments. To produce the measure, the
tworatingsareweightedbytheloadingsderivedfromprincipalcomponents
estimation. The resulting score provides a measure of the tendency to make
opportunistic use of public power.
The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
provides a second measure. The CPIA provides an annual evaluation of the
conduct of governments that have loans outstanding with the Bank. The
Bank’s rating covers the policy performance of the government in twenty
speciﬁc areas, grouped into four major categories (see table 10.10 Scoring
the country’s performance in each area from 1, for low, to 5, for high,
the Bank calculates an aggregate score, or CPIA, which is the un-weighted
average of the rating in each of the twenty areas.
20 The proof is reported in Humphreys and Bates (2002). The logic derives from Adam and
O’Connell (1999). Note that while formally this equilibrium is not unique, most of the
other stationary sub-game perfect equilibria that we have identiﬁed are similar to that
stated.
21 Fora dditional evidence, see Kanz (2005) and Stasavage (2005).
22 http://www.countrydata.com/wizard/.372 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 10.10 Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA).
Disaggregated Elements of CPIA Index
I. Macroeconomic management
1. General macroeconomic performance
2. Fiscal policy
3. Management of external debt
4. Macroeconomic management capacity
5. Sustainability of structural reforms
II. Public sector management
1. Quality of budget and public investment process
2. Efﬁciency and equity of resource mobilization
3. Efﬁciency and equity of public expenditures
4. Accountability of the public service
III. Policies for sustainable and equitable growth
1. Trade policy
2. Foreign exchange regime
3. Financial stability and depth
4. Banking sector efﬁciency and resource mobilization
5. Property rights and rule-based governance
6. Competitive environment for the private sector
7. Factor and product markets
8. Environmental policies and regulations
IV. Policies for reducing inequalities
1. Poverty monitoring and analysis
2. Pro-poor targeting of programs
3. Safety nets
Rating scale: 1 = low; 5 = high
Source:C ountry Policy and Institutional Assessments, Report on 1998
Ratings.W ashington, DC: The World Bank.
Inessence,theCPIAprovidesameasureofthegovernment’sadherenceto
the so-called “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990, 1994). While the
measure contains several ﬂaws,23 it provides an informed assessment of the
23 Regressing the aggregate score against measures of macroeconomic balances – levels of
government consumption, ﬁscal deﬁcits, inﬂation, and so on – shows the measure to
yield highly signiﬁcant relationships with objective measures of policy choices and
enhances our conﬁdence in it. There are however some signiﬁcant limitations. The
measure mixes assessments of policies with outcomes; it assigns equal weights to each
policy; and the policies in Category IV are largely irrelevant to the arguments of this
chapter. Furthermore, there is evidence that the criteria for determining the score have
varied over time. Note that while the CPIA index is based in part on assessments of
institutions, (a) these assessments constitute only a minor portion of the total rating andPolitical reform 373
government’seffortstogenerateasustainablemacroeconomicenvironment,
free of major policy distortions.
4.7.1 Independent variables
Table 10.11 reports the deﬁnitions and distributions of the independent
variables and the sources from which they were drawn.
4.7.2 Institutions
According to the logic of accountability, the incentives that drive govern-
ment responses bite because the government wants to return to ofﬁce but
faces the prospects of the loss of power. A measure of COMPETITION cap-
tures these incentives. By the rules governing the creation of this measure,
ap olity receives a score of 1 if there is no executive in place; 2 if there is
an o n-elected executive; 3 if there is an elected executive but no electoral
competition;4ifthereisanelectedexecutive,andcompetitionbetweencan-
didates but not between parties (because opposition parties are banned);
5i f there is an elected executive and competition between candidates but
not between parties (even though opposition parties are legal); and 6 if
there is an elected executive, with competition between candidates backed
by opposing parties taking place during the electoral campaign. A score of
7i s assigned if the executive’s vote share is less than 75 percent (Beck et al.
2001).24
4.7.3 Discount rate
In the model, the government is forward-looking: it compares the short-
term beneﬁts from adopting self-interested policies with the longer-term
costs of the loss of ofﬁce. The power of the incentives to which institutions
of accountability give rise thus depends upon the government’s rate of dis-
count.Affectingthevaluethegovernmentplacesuponfuturebeneﬁtsfrom
ofﬁce is its assessment of political risk.
TheStateFailureTaskForce(Goldstoneetal.2003)offersasuitablemea-
sure. This measure – labeled PROBLEM – indicates whether each country
wasapartoftheStateFailureTaskForce’s“problemset”inthepreviousyear
(b) were the Bank raters inclined to give higher ratings to countries that exhibited higher
levels of political accountability, then this would bias us towards ﬁnding such a positive
correlation in the data, contrary to what we in fact ﬁnd (see below).
24 The variable MULTI-PARTY, employed earlier, is a proper sub-set of this scale. It
possesses fewer categories than COMPETITION simply because Africa contains no
countries that exhibit the requisite characteristics for some of them. Here we employ
global samples and therefore use the fully articulated scale.T
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by virtue of being embroiled in a civil conﬂict, undergoing extreme levels
of violence, or experiencing an adverse regime change.25
4.7.4 Properties of the selectorate
According to the logic of the model, the degree to which a government
will employ political power to produce collective beneﬁts depends upon
the size of the selectorate. The larger the number of veto points within the
institutions of government, the more inclusive must be the government’s
core coalition. The logic of the model therefore suggests that the larger the
numberofvetopointsintheinstitutionsofgovernment,themorelikelywill
policy-makers be to promote the creation of collective goods. The variable,
CHECKS, is based upon the number of independent parts of the political
process. It uses information regarding the number of different parties in a
governingcoalitionandtheextenttowhichthereisacompetitivelegislature
independent of the President or Prime Minister’s party.26
4.7.5 Economic structures
Policy-makers are constrained by the types of economies in which they
function. In particular, if economic agents are able to protect themselves
from predation by reducing production or by moving their assets, then
extractive policies will yield fewer beneﬁts to government and governments
will possess stronger incentives to refrain from them. Two variables capture
the ease with which rents can be extracted. The ﬁrst, AGRICPOP, measures
theshareofthepopulationthatisdependentuponagriculturalproduction.
Thesecond,OIL,measuresthevalueofoilproductionasashareofGDP.In
eachcase,weexpectnegativerelationsbetweenthesemeasuresofeconomic
structure and the government’s policy choices.
4.7.6 Control variables
A small set of variables provides information on the wealth of the country,
GDP growth rates, and time. The Africa dummy in the pooled regressions
that employ the global dataset provides an important check on our argu-
ment. For if the reasoning provides an adequate theory of the policy prefer-
ences of Africa’s governments, then the coefﬁcient on the African dummy
should fail to attain statistical signiﬁcance, when included in models that
contain the variables that capture the logic of accountability.27
25 More information on this measure can be found on the homepage of the State Failure
Task Force, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfcodebk.htm.
26 Each of the DPI variables, CHECKS1 and CHECKS2 were used in the analysis.
27 We stress that the results presented here do not take account of the possible impact of
policy on the supposedly independent variables. Our results are robust to the replacement
of independent variables with their lags. We have yet to model these endogenousPolitical reform 377
4.8 Estimation
Iﬁrstestimateourstatisticalmodelsusingapooledsampleofobservations.
I then re-estimate each model introducing country-speciﬁc effects and the
lag of the dependent variable. Since a ﬁxed-effects model that includes a
laggeddependentvariablemayintroducebiasinﬁnitesamples(Wooldridge
2002), I report one version of each model that employs the Arrelano and
BondGeneralizedMethodofMoments(GMM)estimatorandasecondthat
employs systems GMM.28
Table10.12 presents results for OPPORTUNISM for both an African and
aw orld sample. Table 10.13 presents similar results for CPIA. In the case of
OPPORTUNISM, the analysis is based upon data from 103–104 nations, of
which 28–29 are from Africa, depending on-data availability; the samples
cover the period 1985–95. In the case of CPIA, the global sample includes
95–96nationsandtheAfricansample36–37andcoverstheperiod1975–90.
PositivecoefﬁcientsforthevariablesrelatingtoOPPORTUNISMindicate
that higher levels of the variable yield a lower tendency for the government
to employ public powers to extract private beneﬁts from the economy. In
the case of CPIA, positive coefﬁcients suggest that higher levels of the inde-
pendent variable yield a stronger tendency on the part of governments to
use public policy to generate a stable macroeconomic environment.
4.8.1 Control variables
Turning ﬁrst to the control variables, note the pronounced tendency for
hysteresisinpublicpolicy:themagnitudeandsigniﬁcanceofthecoefﬁcients
on the lagged dependent variables indicate that policies, once chosen, tend
to persist. As expected, wealth and GDP growth are associated with more
favorable policy ratings.
4.8.2 The Nature of the economy
When corrected for bias arising from the incidence of a lagged dependent
variable, there is scattered evidence in the Africa sample that increases in
the importance of primary products in the private economy lead to the
adoption of self-interested policies. When OIL is employed as a measure of
resource appropriability, the results for the pooled regressions support the
relationships directly, but we note that insofar as public goods provision, as recorded by
the World Bank, may increase the competitiveness of institutions, this should lead to an
upward bias in the estimated correlation, and hence, a bias against our result.
28 Arellano and Bond (1991). The results reported do not take account of the categorical
and censored nature of the dependent variable. While formally categorical, the dependent
variables in fact contain as many as thirty values. And although formally bounded, there
is little clustering of data on the boundaries. We therefore ﬁnd that employing Tobit
models made little impact on our estimates.378 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 10.12 OPPORTUNISM as dependent variable.
Africa World
Pooleda FE ABa Pooleda FE ABa
Sample
method
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Theoretic variables
COMPETITION 0.01 0.032 0.027 0.049 0.019 0.023
0.67 3.62    2.14   5.05    2.71    2.07  
CHECKS 0.079  0.021  0.029 0.045  0.003 0.016
3.08    1.23 1.05 3.95    0.28 1.25
PROBLEM (lag)  0.225  0.09  0.013  0.243  0.079  0.012
4.16    2.33   0.30 5.75    2.60    0.16
AGRIPOP (Lag)  0.524  1.136  1.768  0.521  1.184  1.294
2.90    1.60 1.27 3.87    2.58   1.47
OIL (lag)  0.372 0.287 0.141  0.785 0.346 1.016
2.62    1.34 0.54 6.27    1.76  2.71   
Control variables
GDP (lag) 0.134 0.037 0.025 0.076  0.015  0.025
7.40    0.87 0.23 12.75    1.71  1.27
GROWTH (lag) 0.002 0  0.001 0.023 0.003  0.002
0.53 0.12 0.40 6.09    2.33   0.93
YEAR 0.027 0.01 0.014 0.075 0.028 0.023
4.03    1.96  1.33 18.02    7.53    2.66   
Lag of the dependent
variable
– 0.789 0.521 – 0.772 0.812
– 19.02    4.52    – 40.62    16.58   
Dummy variable for SSA – – – 0.024 – –
––– 0.43 – –
Constant  53.39  19.2 –  150.238  54.971 –
4.07    1.83  – 18.10    7.36    –
N 338 314 285 1,273 1,180 1,074
R2 0.37 0.74 0.65 0.82
No.c ross-sectional units 29 28 104 103
Arellano–Bond test that
average autocovariance in
residuals of order 2 is 0:
(z-statistic)
1.06  1.49
Notes:A bsolute value of t-statistics listed below coefﬁcients.
a Robust t-statistics reported,   signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.Political reform 379
Table 10.13 CPIA as dependent variable.
Africa World
Pooleda FE ABa Pooleda FE ABa
Sample
method
Model (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
Theoretic variables
COMPETITION 0.011 0.001  0.004  0.015 0.012 0.004
0.71 0.05 0.15 1.32 1.24 0.17
CHECKS 0.11  0.001  0.026 0.056  0.005  0.01
3.55    0.02 0.55 3.31    0.32 0.41
PROBLEM (lag)  0.091 0.034  0.015  0.093  0.065  0.147
1.25 0.48 0.16 1.96  1.55 1.90 
AGRIPOP (Lag)  0.33  1.72  3.344  0.155  1.033  1.89
1.72  1.71  1.41 1.13 1.63 1.56
OIL (lag)  1.505  0.068  0.439  1.346  0.303  0.127
7.74    0.13 0.72 9.31    0.90 0.34
Control variables
Per capita GDP (lag) 0.127 0.022  0.179 0.107  0.038  0.16
4.90    0.39 1.38 7.17    1.50 3.17   
Growth of GDP (lag) 0.023 0.008 0.005 0.031 0.009 0.004
6.02    2.75    1.32 8.23    3.88    1.45
Year 0.01  0.005  0.009 0.019 0  0.001
1.75  0.71 0.81 4.84    0.05 0.08
Lag of the dependent
variable
– 0.635 0.641 – 0.664 0.687
– 17.15    10.42    – 29.14    16.11   
Dummy variable for SSA – – –  0.032 – –
––– 0.63 – –
Constant  16.896 12.093 –  35.919 2.038 –
1.51 0.83 – 4.50    0.21 –
N 507 501 463 1227 1198 1099
R2 0.27 0.46 0.24 0.49
No.c ross-sectional units 37 36 96 95
Arellano–Bond test that
average autocovariance in
residuals of order 2 is 0:
(z-statistic)
 0.97 0.10
Notes:A bsolute value of t-statistics listed below coefﬁcients.
a Robust t-statistics reported,   signiﬁcant at 10%;    signiﬁcant at 5%;     signiﬁcant at 1%.380 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
hypothesized relationship between the costs of private goods extraction for
the choices of governments. Higher values of oil production correlate with
higherlevelsofOPPORTUNISM.Theresultsfortheequationsthatemploy
differenced data do not behave in a similar manner, however; in addition,
threeofthecoefﬁcientsderivedfromtheglobalsampleyieldevidenceagainst
this argument.
More consistentistheevidenceoftheimpactofagriculturallydependent
economies. In the case of both dependent variables – OPPORTUNISM
and CPIA – and both samples, the pooled regressions drawn from African
data suggest that the greater the weight of the agricultural sector, the more
opportunistic a government’s policy choices. Fixed-effects estimates from
theglobalsampleyieldfurthersupportfortheargument,whenratingsfrom
private investors are employed. The sign on this measure of the importance
of agriculture is negative for both samples. It fails to attain signiﬁcance,
however.
4.8.3 The selectorate
The model underscores the importance of a third set of variables: those
relating to the size of the selectorate. The larger the size of the selectorate,
the logic suggests, the stronger the incentives for the government to reward
its supporters by producing public goods.
Oneindicatorofthesizeoftheselectorateisthenumberofvetopointsin
the institutions of government, and thus the number of points of entry for
politicalinterests;thegreaterthenumberofvetopoints,thelargertheeffec-
tive selectorate. The pooled regressions suggest that governments that are
constrained by checks and balances, and so face multiple veto points, adopt
policies that elicit higher investor ratings. This is true for both dependent
variablesandforbothsamplesinthepooledregressions.Theseinstitutional
features are “slow moving,” however. Possibly for this reason, measures of
their impact fail to emerge in the equations that use differenced values of
the variables.
4.8.4 Discount rate
The data provide evidence of the impact of discounting. If a government
is sufﬁciently unstable to fall into the State Failure Task Force’s problem
set (i.e. PROBLEM = 1), the policy environment deteriorates for private
investors, as measured by OPPORTUNISM. The same relationship holds
for the World Bank ratings of government policies in the pooled global
sample. The magnitudes in regressions (I), (II), (IV), and (V) associate a
changeinPROBLEMfrom1to0withafallinOPPORTUNISMofbetween
one-tenth and one-ﬁfth of a standard deviation.Political reform 381
4.8.5 Institutions
Ofgreatestinterest,however,areourresultsregardingpoliticalinstitutions.
BoththeAfricanandglobalsamplesofferevidenceofarelationshipbetween
electoralcompetitionandOPPORTUNISM.Theresultsarestronglysignif-
icantinallbutonespeciﬁcation.Themagnitudesofthecoefﬁcientssuggest
that an increase in COMPETITION from its lowest to its highest value is
associated with an increase in the OPPORTUNISM score of approximately
one-ﬁfth of a standard deviation; as noted above, this increase in turn asso-
ciates with an increase in growth rates of approximately one-quarter of a
percentage point.
Note,however,thatwhenCPIAisusedasameasureofpolicychoice,then
thereisnoevidenceforarelationbetweeninstitutionsandpublicpolicy,once
other determinants of policy choice are taken into account. Indeed in some
models there is evidence that when governments face risks from electoral
competition,theythenchoosepoliciesthatdistortthemacroeconomy((IX)
and (X)) and so receive lower ratings from the World Bank.
Note the African dummy in the global sample in tables 10.2 and 10.3.
In both cases, the coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant. Within the context of the
model,Africangovernmentsbehaveinwaysthatareindistinguishablefrom
governments elsewhere.
4.9 Political business cycle
The evidence thus suggests that introducing political competition stays the
hand of predatory governments but fails to inspire them to manage better
themacroeconomy.Indeed,theevidencesuggeststheoppositemaybetrue:
that governments subject to electoral risk are less willing to adhere to the
Washington consensus.
To aidininterpretingtheseﬁndings,IturntotheworkofBlock(2002)and
ofBlock,Ferree,andSingh(2003).Employingdatafromforty-sevenAfrican
states over the period of political reform, 1980–94, Block (2002) sought to
determine whether the introduction of elections affected the policy choices
of governments; Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003) narrowed the focus to
elections in which opposition parties could challenge incumbent regimes.
In exploring the link between elections and policy choice, Block (2002)
draws on the so-called “na¨ ıve” and “rational” models of politically induced
business cycles.29 In both, politicians seek ofﬁce and are fully informed; the
citizens prefer better economic conditions to worse and lack full informa-
tion. In the “na¨ ıve” models, citizens can observe aggregate features of the
macroeconomy: inﬂation and unemployment. Being unsophisticated, they
29 See Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1990), and also Lindbeck (1976).382 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
react onlyt op r e s e nt information: if the present level of inﬂation is low and
employmenthigh,thentheyaremorelikelytovotefortheincumbent,evenif
neitherlevelissustainable.Theirna¨ ıvet´ eleavesthemopentomanipulation.
Giventhecitizens’decisionrule,thegovernmentretainsofﬁcebyproducing
unsustainableeconomicboomsinelectionyearsfollowedbycontractionsin
thepost-electionperiod.Thefailuretosmoothintertemporalconsumption
imposes welfare losses on the economy, even while the politicians reap the
political beneﬁts.
In the second version of the model, the voters prefer politicians who can
competently manage the economy. To signal their competence, the politi-
cians generate public services, and the more competent they are the greater
the amounts of such services they can generate for any given level of rev-
enues. Because citizens are sophisticated,p olitical competition offers com-
petent incumbents the opportunity to reveal their type: they signal their
type by ﬁnancing public services even in bad times. Divisible goods can be
consumedimmediatelywhilethebeneﬁtsofcapitalgoodsaccruewithalag:
not only greater expenditure but also the displacement of capital formation
bypublicconsumptionthusresultinequilibrium.Politicalcompetitionthus
leads not only to the failure to smooth intertemporal consumption but also
to the failure to achieve high levels of growth.30
In testing the ﬁrst of these models, Block ﬁnds signiﬁcant evidence of
pre-election increases in the growth of money supply and decreases in the
nominal rate of interest and the exchange rate in non-CFA countries. The
pro-cyclical impact of these changes emerges in the post-election period,
whentherateofmoneygrowthturnsnegativeandtheinterestandexchange
ratesr ise. While the rates of inﬂation in pre-election periods remain higher
than expected, given the logic of the model, they rise signiﬁcantly in the
post-election period, thus lending additional support to the theory. Block
alsoﬁndsevidenceinsupportofthepoliticalcompetencemodel,withpublic
expenditures and government consumption rising signiﬁcantly in the pre-
election periods, along with the level of government debt.
Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003)r estrict their attention to presidential
elections in which there was competition for ofﬁce. In years in which there
are competitive elections, they ﬁnd, the share of government consumption
inGDPincreasesontheorderof1.5percentagepoints,whichissigniﬁcantly
greater than that for non-competitive elections (Block, Ferree, and Singh
30 As noted in Block (2001) and Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003). See also Drazan (2000).
The absence of strong and independent monetary institutions in Africa removes a basic
objection to the application of models of the political business cycle. In addition, African
governments tend to be presidential and with ﬁxed-term limits, thus limiting the
possibility of endogeneity. To be noted is that struggles between capital and labor rarely
follow the lines of partisan cleavage in Africa, thus diminishing the value of the standard
partisan models of the political business cycle (e.g. Hibbs 1977).Political reform 383
2003:460).Competitiveelectionsare“associatedwithanearly13percentage
point increase in the rate of real money growth over that observed in non-
competitiveelectionyears”(2003:461).And“competitiveelectionsaretyp-
ically followed by devaluations on the order of 20 percentage points greater
than [for] non-competitive elections” (2003: 462) – an adjustment made
necessary by the imbalances introduced by the changes in ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy and by the postponements of adjustments in the pre-election
periods.Innocasedotheyﬁndnon-competitiveelectionsyieldingevidence
ofpoliticallyinducedbusinesscycles;evidenceofpoliticalshocksisconﬁned
to elections in which there is political competition.
In absorbing these ﬁndings, it is important to stress the second major
ﬁnding reported by Brock, Ferree, and Singh (2003): that the relationship
between electoral competition and macroeconomic distortions peaks with
the so-called “founding election” – the election that occurred at the time of
the transition from authoritarian rule. Thereafter, the relationship attenu-
ates. This ﬁnding may suggest a growing sophistication on the part of the
electorate and an increased conviction on the part of those in power that
the electorate may punish rather than reward incumbents who manipulate
the macroeconomy in search of political advantage.
4.10 Discussion
Whydoesaccountabilityfailtoinducemonetaryrestraint?Addressingonce
againthelogicofpoliticalaccountability,Isearchforanswerstothisquestion
by focusing on several key assumptions of the model.
4.10.1 Candidates
According to the model, if the incumbent fails to meet the performance
criterion set by the selectorate, then she is replaced by another randomly
selected from a pool of identical candidates. But what if the candidates are
heterogenous? Might not the selectorate then be tempted to reinstate an
incumbent who possessed qualities that it admired, even were she to fail
to deliver decent economic performance? And, anticipating that behavior,
might the incumbent not then ﬁnd the performance criteria incredible and
therefore ignore them?
Addressing this possibility compels us to realize that party competi-
tion and competitive elections are not themselves sufﬁcient to ensure
accountability. Phrased differently, buried in the accountability model lies
an assumption of political convergence: it is convergence that renders the
selectorate willing to accept a random draw in place of an incumbent who
has failed to meet their performance standards. Convergence results when
parties and candidates cater to the tastes of the median voter in order to
wine lections. Such behavior is most likely when there are two parties and384 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
plurality voting. But, in Africa, virtually all of the French-speaking, states
and several of the anglophone ones employ proportional representation.31
Andevenwherepluralityvotingisemployed,regional,religious,andethnic
differences make it difﬁcult to reduce the number of parties such that the
centripetal incentives created by plurality voting override the centrifugal
forces arising from substantive differences (Cox 1997).
To illustrate,considerthecaseofKenya.Whenin1991theKenyaAfrican
National Union (KANU) government of Daniel Arap Moi legalized the
formation of other parties, leading dissidents formed the Forum for the
Restoration of Democracy (FORD). But in 1992, FORD split, with lead-
ers from the Central Province forming FORD-Asili (or “original”) while
Western Province, especially Luo-speaking leaders, formed FORD-Kenya.
Further clouding the picture was the formation of the Democratic Party by
MwaiKibaki,formerVicePresident,andyetathirdunitofFORDbySimeon
Nyachae, a prominent advisor to previous presidents. Given that a plurality
of votes was sufﬁcient to win, the number of opposition parties made it
possible for Moi to remain in ofﬁce, even when opposed by 60 percent of
the electorate in the 1992 election (Throup and Hornsby 1998). Behaving
in a sophisticated fashion, party leaders responded as theory would predict
(Cox1997;Magaloni2004):theysoughtalliancesandmergers.Thisstrategy
offered the beneﬁts of defeating their least preferred candidate (the incum-
bent,PresidentMoi)butatthecostofthepossiblelossoftheirmostpreferred
(themselves). It was not until the twenty-ﬁrst century that the opposition
parties agree to merge. When they did, KANU was swept from power. That
it had remained in power for over a decade while facing competitive elec-
tions and exhibiting extraordinary incompetence in its management of the
Kenyan economy underscores the power of the assumption of convergence
underlying the accountability model, and how this assumption may limit
its applicability in contemporary Africa.
4.10.2 Voter sophistication
Theaccountabilitymodeldemandsthatthevotersbeabletooptimize.When
they set performance benchmarks, should they place them too high the
incumbent may despair of meeting the standard for re-selection; knowing
sheislikelytobe“ﬁred,”shewillindulgeherselfwhileinofﬁce.Ifthecriteria
aresettoolow,thentheincumbentneednotdelivergoodpolicyinorderto
stay inp o w e r .
There is scattered evidence that Africa’s electorates may be too demand-
ing. Reports from the Afrobarometer surveys comment that “the general
public may have an overly rosy view of the diminished capabilities of the
31 See the important contributions: Mozaffar (1998) and Mozaffar et al. (2003).Political reform 385
African state” (Afrobarometer, 2004b: 38): over 52 percent of those sur-
veyedi n ﬁfteen countries thought that “the government can solve . . . all
or most of the country’s problems” (2004b: 38). When entertaining such
loftyexpectations,electoratescanbeunforgiving.BrattonandvandeWalle
(1997) note between 1990 and 1994, eleven heads of state were voted out
of ofﬁce, with three others choosing not to run (Block 2002: 206). If such
behavior is evidence of excessively high expectations, rulers may behave as
unconstrained even in competitive political environments.
Recall the ICPR ratings by private investors, however, that suggest that
governments in competitive political environments do behave with greater
restraint: COMPETITION is associated with less OPPORTUNISM. Recall,
too, the evidence marshaled by Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003): even if
incumbentsaredefeatedincompetitiveelections,itisnotforwantofstriving
to stay in ofﬁce. Rather than resigning themselves to defeat in the face of
excessively high performance standards, as this argument suggests, they
instead manipulated ﬁscal and monetary policy in an attempt to remain in
ofﬁce.
What if voters evaluated politicians in terms of who they were rather
than what they achieved? That is, what if rather than setting performance
standards too high, voters instead set them too low, allowing politicians
to shirk. Beliefs that voters behave this way are commonly held both by
citizens and by students of Africa: the African electorate is held to engage
in identity rather than performance voting. But if this were in fact the case,
thenonceagainwewouldnotexpecttoﬁndincreasedaccountabilityleading
to increased restraint, as noted by investors’ ratings. When there is political
competition, these data suggest, elites ﬁnd it necessary to abjure the use of
power for self-aggrandizement, which they surely could do if receiving the
unreserved support of co-ethnics.
While still focusing on the preferences of voters, we can focus on yet
another assumption of the argument: that voters would prefer policies that
conformtotheWashingtonConsensus.Returnonceagaintotheportraitof
Africa’selectoratespresentedintheAfrobarometerstudies(Bratton,Mattes,
and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). “By a large margin” (Afrobarometer 2004a: 14),
these surveys report, African citizens support an active economic role for
governments and prefer a mixed to a market-based economy. They support
trade protection. “There is widespread popular resistance to public sector
reform” (2004a: 14). And “most people want the government to remain
involvedinagriculturalmarketing”(2004a:14).Inthewordsoftheauthors
of the Afrobarometer survey “their vision favors state intervention above
market forces” (2004a: 14).
Even though Africa’s citizens may prefer state intervention, however, the
data from the surveys indicate that also they loathe inﬂation and desire
employment (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2004). Preferring an386 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
activist government is not the same as preferring a government that main-
tainsanunsustainablemonetarypolicy.Giventheseconsiderations,national
politicians might then be reluctant to generate macroeconomic booms for
short-term political advantages.
Thefailureofpoliticalaccountabilitytoinducemacroeconomicrestraint
may therefore not derive from the preferences of citizens. If Africa’s voters
can not optimize, then why does political competition lead to lower levels
of OPPORTUNISM? If Africa’s voters were lulled by the forces of identity
politics,thenwhydoesaccountabilityappeartocurbelitepredation?Andif
Africa’s voters were insensitive to the costs of macroeconomic mismanage-
ment, why would they so strongly condemn inﬂation and unemployment?
Perhaps political accountability fails to induce macroeconomic discipline
not because of the voters’ unwillingness to impose the evaluative standards
required to make accountability work, but rather because of their inability
to do so.
4.10.3 Information
To applythestandardsrequiredtoinducemacroeconomicconstraint,voters
presumably have to monitor the levels of inﬂation and unemployment.
EmploymentﬁguresaredifﬁculttocomebyinAfrica,however;indeed,given
the size of the subsistence sector and the informal economy, employment
is difﬁcult to deﬁne. Nor are average price levels common knowledge; even
whencalculatedwithprecision,theirreleaseistoolongdelayedtoassistinthe
makingofvotingdecisions.Itisthereforedifﬁcultforcitizenstomonitorthe
management of the national economy, to judge the economic performance
of incumbents, and thus to be able to implement punishment strategies.
Knowingthat,politicianswouldhavelessreasontopracticemacroeconomic
restraint.
Notethatwhiletheassumptionofcompleteinformationworksagainstthe
accountability model, it works in favor of models of the politically induced
businesscycle.Suchmodelsstresspoliticians’abilitytoexploitinformational
asymmetries and thus their ability to manipulate the economy in ways that
whileeconomicallyharmfularepoliticallyadvantageous.Thischaracteristic
ofAfrica’spoliticaleconomies–thelackofinformation–thusstandsasthe
best candidate for exploring why political reform failed to produce a more
stable macroeconomic environment.
5C onclusion
Many in Africa championed political reform for its own right. They desired
liberty,freedom,andagovernmentthatplacedthepublicinterestabovetheir
own.ManyalsochampionedreformasameansofsecuringbettereconomicPolitical reform 387
policies.Byintroducingcompetitionintopoliticallife,theysoughttorender
governments accountable to private citizens, thereby aligning the political
interests of incumbents with the collective interest in policies that would
strengthen the economy.
The evidence suggests that political reforms have rendered Africa’s gov-
ernments less opportunistic: private investors rated them as less likely to
repudiate debts or to expropriate investments. But reform appears to have
had less impact upon the management of the macroeconomy. In the face
of prospective political defeat, the evidence suggests, governments in com-
petitive systems tend to spend more, to borrow more, to print money, and
to postpone needed revaluations of their currencies than do those not fac-
ing political competition. The relationship between political competition
and macroeconomic mismanagement appears to have weakened over time,
suggesting that voters have learned, or that politicians believe them to have
become more sophisticated. The empirical results nonetheless pose a chal-
lengetothosewhoseekinpoliticalreformtheremedyforAfrica’seconomic
malaise.
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